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Of all the modes of human intellectual activity prognostication is
probably the most treacherous. It may not influence people, but cer-
tainly it will alienate one's friends. No one paid much heed to the
warnings of the unfortunate Cassandra, and there is no record that
either the Oracle of Delphi or the Cumaean Sibyl -had any bosom com-
panions. But every well-ordered conference needs a sacrificial goat,
and for that role I probably possess a natural affinity, even though my
sex may differ from that of the Sibyls.
Because the crystal ball is always, at least potentially, cloudy the
temptation is ever present to seek refuge in definition, ambiguity, or
riddles. It was no accident that the Sibylline leaves were scattered.
Thus one might be quite within his rights to ask rhetorically what is
meant by librarianship? by classification? and by the future?
Doubtless, I too will end by "hedging my bets'* in this way, but for the
moment, at least, I shall throw discretion, rather than prophetic
words, to the winds and declare bluntly and without equivocation that
I think library classification is here to stay.
Not long ago I remarked to a friend who has long been a leader
among special librarians, that on recent visits to England and Brazil
I had been repeatedly asked why librarians in the United States were
so belligerently opposed to classification. My friend's reply was im-
mediate, explosive, and, I am afraid, very typical of most of us
"That's easy, because it's no good!" The substance of this essay,
then is as much a protest against such a misunderstanding of the
role of classification in librarianship, as it is a forecast of the future
Like the Apostles' Creed, it may be regarded as, "The essence of
things hoped for the substance of things unseen."
THE NATURE OF CLASSIFICATION
Niels Bohr has reminded us that knowledge is synthesized within
the human mind as a conceptual framework, a framework that ideally
at least is an unambiguous logical representation of relations between
and among experiences. This framework is not static but must be
adapted to provide for new experience. The limits of expandability of
any such frame, then, are always finite and eventually they prove
too confining to comprehend new experience and abandonment becomes
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unavoidable. Such revolutions in thinking may be born of the most
intensive specialization, yet they dictate a reorientation of the unity of
all knowledge.
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Thus the physicists at the close of the nineteenth
century assumed that their task was essentially finished and resigned
themselves to refining measurement and to computing the constants
in nature with greater accuracy. But the discoveries of recent de-
cades shattered forever their comfortable little world - a world
which will not be tolerated again.
2 Because the evolution of man's
knowledge is not a predictable and finite process, because a field of
endeavor may never properly be regarded as closed, and hence be-
cause classification can never be seriously advanced with a pretense
of ultimacy, we have come at times to question whether anything use-
ful can be gained by attempts at classification, especially since the
Unified-Science movement tends to obliterate distinction among the
disciplines. But the permanence of any one system of classification
is not a valid measure of the utility of classification per se, and it
has nothing whatever to do with classification as a mode of human
thought.
Far more relevant to the present discussion is John Dewey's con-
tention that knowledge is classification, for knowledge is not just an
awareness of events but of events-with-meanings. The assertion that
to know is to define implies the recognition that wherever there is
knowledge there is explicitly present a universal. As Dewey says,
To hold that cognition is recognition is to concede that likeness,
a relation, rather than existence, is central. And to be acquant-
ed with anything is to be aware what it is like, in what sort of
ways it is likely to behave. These features, character, kind,
sort, universal, likeness, fall within the universe of meaning.
Hence the theories which make them constitutive of knowledge
acknowledge that having meanings is a prerequisite of knowing.
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So, also, Gordon Childe holds that knowledge is a pattern of communi-
cable ideas symbolized in language, a structured pattern of categories
which connotes classification. Such categories as space, time, causal-
ity, substance, etc. denote ways in which empirical data, since know-
ledge is assumed to derive from experience with the external world,
are supposed to hang together to form a pattern, a pattern which
represents for each individual some segment of the universe as he
comprehends it.
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This insistence of both the philosopher and the anthropologist on
the dependence of knowledge upon classification is not coincidental.
As the present writer, following closely the work of Jerome Bruner .
and others, pointed out in a paper presented in 1957 at the Dorking
conference on classification, the total process of cognition, of the
utilization of information in thinking and problem solving, is one in
which class identity is inferred from observed criterial properties or
attributes exhibited by an object or event.
5
''Thinking," then, as it is
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commonly understood, is a process of pattern creation or pattern
recognition, i.e., classification, and conjunctive, relational, and dis-
junctive concepts are the warp and woof of the pattern, the lines of
reference of the classification. These concepts may be either "cer-
tainties" or "probabilities" depending upon whether or not they
coincide with past experience to the extent that they can be assigned
to class membership. Cognition, then, results in pattern, and the
brain is the loom by which it is woven.
6 One is reminded of Mephisto-
pheles' explanation to the young student in Goethe's Faust:
In fact, when men are fabricating thought,
It goes as when a weaver's masterpiece is wrought.
One treadle sets a thousand threads a-going,
And to and fro the shuttle flies;
Quite unperceived the threads are flowing,
One stroke effects a thousand ties. 7
The categories which man formulates, the terms of which he sorts
out in responding to the world about him, are strongly conditioned by
the culture into which he is born. Each culture formulates its own
master plan, its structure of values, its own classification of know-
ledge, in a manner that reflects the common language, the way of life,
the religious beliefs, and the accumulated experiences of the group.
Thus each man's personal history images the traditions and thought
patterns of his culture. The events of which his life is composed and
the relations those events, experiences, and perceptions bear to each
other must be filtered through the categorical system he has learned,
or he departs from it at his peril. All thinking, all knowledge, begins,
as Susanne Langer has stated, in the basic formulation of sense per-
ception, for all thinking is conceptual and conception begins in the
recognition of pattern, relationship, the comprehension of Gestalt.*
Thus man is literally ensnared in a web of classification. Within
limits he can, to paraphrase Dr. Johnson, alter the reticulations and
decussations and vary the interstices between the intersections, but
he can no more escape from his network of concepts than could Lemuel
Gulliver break the strands by which the Lilliputians held him captive.
Only the innovators, the discoverers, have the ability and the courage
to sever even a limited number of these bonds, and over them hangs
the constant threat of ridicule, social ostracism, and even the hem-
lock itself. Yet it is such as they who reshape the pattern, relocate
the ties of relationship, and thus contribute to a redefinition of the
cultural pattern which future generations solidify into accepted stereo-
types as their predecessors had formalized the patterns of an earlier
day. In such manner does the social conscience make cowards of us
all and sickly o'er our native hue of resolution. Thus, to quote Susanne
Langer,
The modern mind is an incredible complex of impressions and
transformations; and its product is a fabric of meanings that
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would make the most elaborate dream of the most ambitious
tapestry-weaver look like a mat. The warp of that fabric con-
sists of what we call
'data,' the signs to which experience has
conditioned us to attend, and upon which we act often without
any conscious ideation. The woof is symbolism. Out of signs
and symbols we weave our tissue of 'reality.'
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Hellenic thought was unified by the study of first principles, for
which Plato's dialectic provided the method and which Aristotle
formulated as a science of metaphysics. Medieval scholarship,
which was theocentric in the extreme, was logically ordered by a
theology in which were set forth, with due proportion and emphasis,
the truths, relating to God and man, man and man, and man and
nature. The Age of Enlightenment was dominated by a search for
a rational explanation of the universe and human behavior was
measured against the cold clear light of reason, and from its roots,
thrust deep into the earlier insistence of Bacon on the importance
of the human faculties, modern principles of classification emerged.
THE NATURE OF LIBRARY CLASSIFICATION
Library classification, even before that memorable Sunday morn-
ing when, in the Amherst chapel, the decimal system burst upon
Melvil Dewey like the revelation of the Apocalypse, was a transfer
from, or more precisely a reflection of, man's unceasing quest for
an ordered universe of structured relationships. Callimachus
organized the collections of the great Alexandriana in accordance
with the major categories, or disciplines, into which Greek thought
was divided. The monastic libraries of the medieval world reflected,
as one might assume, the theological doctrines of the Church, and
relegated, according to Prideaux, the books of the heretics to "mourn-
ing and dirt."
1 J
Naude, in the mid-seventeenth century, was a true
descendant of the Renaissance in his return to the classical example
of the Alexandriana. The great system of Brunet, which according to
Gustav Mouravit is both synthetic and analytic, presents in its prin-
cipal divisions "the great sphere into which the activities of human
thought are deployed," while at the same time offering "in their min-
ute details, the products of those activities" and following "all the
ramifications on which those activities are exercised." 1 Brunet
traces the course of human thought from God, through justice, law,
and man's relation to man, through his knowledge of his environment,
the external world, and the manifestations of the human imagination,
to the eventual contemplation of the record of the human adventure.
Thus it represents something of a compromise between the theologians
and the precursors of modern science, and invites comparison with
and, indeed, is reminiscent of Bacon's tripartite classification of the
human faculties of memory, reason, and imagination.
Brunet died too early to be influenced by Darwin, but both Dewey
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and Cutter, and especially the latter's principle of expansion, were
deeply influenced by the doctrine of evolution. But it was the classifi-
cation of James Duff Brown that most strongly reflected the evolution-
ary thesis. Brown postulated that every science or art springs from
some definite source and that in its categorization some serial develop-
ment may be assumed. Thus he predicated his scheme upon the as-
sumption that in the order of things there first was matter and force,
which gave rise to life, which, in time, produced mind, which eventuat-
ed in record. Martel and Hanson at the Library of Congress built their
structure on the foundations Cutter had laid, and the same may be
said with respect to Bruxelles' debt to Dewey. Though in the latter,
the forefathers of the Universal Decimal Classification at least recog-
nized that the content of books cannot be adequately described in
terms of a single linguistic isolate. Hence they made an heroic effort
to introduce into the U.D.C. an elaborate system of associative signs
to represent some of the most important relationships by which human
thought is patterned.
Henry E. Bliss who certainly had one of the finest minds yet to
address itself to the problems of library classification, and who de-
vised one of the two most modern schemes now available, attempted
to reconcile in one hierarchical sequence a series of sub- orders, the
developmental, the pedagogic, etc. The system that emerged he be-
lieved to be in harmony with "the order of nature" and the contem-
porary "scientific consensus," and hence, in his opinion, relatively
permanent. In this Bliss was not unlike the nineteenth- century physi-
cists who saw nothing in their futures but improvement in the refining
of measurement and the computing of constants.
Ranganathan is probably the only man who can challenge Bliss on
his own termsand he has done so. Whatever one may think of the
Colon Classification certainly its distinguished creator has surpassed
all others in his grasp of the fundamental problems of organizing the
intellectual content of graphic records. In his facet analysis and its
American counterpart, semantic factoring, the role of classification
in bibliographic organization achieves a new and greater significance
than it ever had as applied to book arrangement or even as exemplified
in the classified catalogue. But despite the work of Ranganathan and
Bliss, and their intellectual kin, library classification as it is thought
of today was born of the eighteenth-century enlightenment and matured
in nineteenth-century Darwinism, with but superficial embellish-
ments that, in the main, are but the tinsel of twentieth- century episte-
mology. To say of library classification that it is utilitarian is not,
in itself, derogatory, it should be useful, but today library classifica-
tion is utilitarian at the lowest level of its capabilities. It does not
structure recorded knowledge in patterns harmonious with the patterns
of thought of the library user, it serves mainly as a device by which
one may find a particular book. The Dewey Decimal Classification, in
whatever edition, and the shelf of drab paper bound volumes that are
the classification of the Library of Congress, are not a gate through
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which the mind is led into the recorded world of the human adventure,
they are only an address-book for the library stacks.
THE REJECTION OF BIBLIOGRAPHIC CLASSIFICATION
The librarian's traditional distrust of the importance of classifi-
cation may be directly attributed to his indifference to the theory of
librarianship. From the days of Dewey, the librarian has viewed
classification as little more than an array of pigeon-holes into which
books might be conveniently slipped, according to the subject of which
they treat, and from which they may be retrieved when that subject is
in demand. But as the world of knowledge expanded these compart-
mentalized arrays became increasingly complex and the problem of
assignment of titles to them involved decisions that were correspond-
ingly involved, until the whole idea was abandoned as excessively
intricate for all purposes except the simple task of physical location.
By contrast the alphabetical subject catalogue seemed a more practica-
ble alternative. But librarians forgot that the alphabetical subject
catalogue itself , as Phyllis Richmond has demonstrated,
12
must, if it is
to achieve its fullest utility, be derived from a classified structuring
of the fields it encompasses. To be sure the subject catalogue was often
rationalized as a supplement to the classification, but in many areas
of library material, particularly in those involving history and geo-
graphy, its terms merely recapitulated the sequence of the classifica-
tion scheme.
The assumption that a subject index can compensate for the inad-
equacies of a classification scheme Bliss has properly characterized
as the subject index illusion which, one should add, arises from a
serious over-simplification of the bibliographic problem. Books are
not, as Dewey and his contemporaries apparently saw them, taxonomic
specimens that can be arranged in a hierarchy of genus, species, and
sub-species according to the presence or absence of a single charac-
teristic or physical property or group of covariant characteristics or
properties, that differentiate the members of one group from those in
another. Library classification has been defined by many people, but
the definition devised by William Randall, and modified slightly by
the present writer, is typical and probably as satisfactory as any for
present purposes. According to this definition a library classification
is:
A list of terms which are specifically different from each other,
used to describe the subject content of graphic records, in-
clusive of all knowledge defined by the limits of the scheme,
infinitely hospitable with regard to significant differences
among the concepts, with an arrangement that is linear, unique,
and meaningful to the user, and which, when applied to graphic
records, results in the arrangement of the records themselves.
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This is pure bibliographic taxonomy, and its fallacy lies buried in
the phrase "terms that describe the subject content of books," for
terms do not define the subject content of books as they define a bio-
logical specimen by categorizing its physical properties. Any attempt
to substitute for classification a system which mechanically coordi-
nates or otherwise manipulates controlled or uncontrolled verbal
isolates, such as uniterms, Zator descriptors, and the like, results,
as Vickery has shown, in increased confusion.
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The librarian and the bibliographic instruments with which he
works together constitute a bridge between the user of graphic records
and the records themselves. Therefore, recourse to graphic records,
or retrieval, must be the focal point of a library theory and the end
toward which all our efforts are directed. But retrieval is not a sim-
ple process of choosing graphic materials from an array of pigeon-
holes, whether those pigeon-holes be a sequence of books on a shelf,
documents in a file, or the representation of bibliographic units in a
catalogue or bibliography. A book, even a simple book, presents a
highly complex pattern of intricately related concepts which are ap-
proached by a user in whose mind there is also a complex pattern of
motive, accumulated experience, and predisposition. The book, or
graphic record, does not present, as is commonly assumed, a fixed
conceptual pattern, or perhaps more precisely, a finite number of in-
terrelated conceptualizations. To be sure the text does not change,
but the interpretation of that text is infinitely variable. A book is the
physical embodiment of what the author thought he said, but only in a
limited way can it speak for itself. What it actually says is what the
mind of the user chooses to put there. It was Ludwig Lewisohn, I
believe, who said that "the seat of beauty is, after all, in the beholding
mind," and so is the content of a book. Any act of communication
can reveal an inexhaustible source of truth or mere sophistry. The
distinction between the two must, as Polanyi has shown, derive from,
the text of the message itself, the conception suggested by it, and
the experience on which it may bear.
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Judgment operates by trying
to adjust these three patterns to each other. The outcome cannot be
predicted from previous acts of communication for there may be in-
volved the decision to correct or otherwise modify previous behavior
or reinterpret experience in terms of some novel conception suggested
by the text, or the result may be a decision to accept previous usage
or behavior, or the text may be completely dismissed as altogether
meaningless. The relationship between book and reader, then, achieves
fruition only to the degree that the pattern of the book's content ap-
proaches coincidence with the thought pattern of the reader. Even in
simple situations this is a complex relationship and the librarian's
eternal hope to attain such a relationship with simple measures can end
only in dissatisfaction. At this moment of fusion between the pattern
of the graphic record and the pattern of recourse to it lies the clue to
all our problems and the end of all our strivings. Here is a problem
as complex as the nature of matter itself and as worthy of serious
research.
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The true role of the librarian, then, is to mediate between book
and reader and the human factor that is the librarian can never be
eliminated. A good classification system, however carefully designed,
can never substitute for a librarian with brains. Properly employed,
however, classification can extend the capabilities of the librarian but
it can never solve all his problems for him, in the way that Dewey
seems to have anticipated, in this psycho-bibliographic relationship
that characterizes the act of reading.
The librarian's rejection of classification arose from the fact that
he misapplied it because he misunderstood its nature and the nature
of the bibliographic process. This misapplication crystalized at a very
early stage of modern library development, and, until recent years,
has remained essentially unchanged. Such misapprehensions of librar-
ians about classification were intensified by the deceptive simplicity of
the alphabetical subject catalog, a form of delusion that encouraged
librarians to ignore the complaints of many scholars that the diction-
ary catalog was almost useless as a guide to the materials of research.
There were other factors that contributed to the librarian's at-
titude toward classification. The enormous costs of reclassification,
costs which grew geometrically as collections increased, seemed to
justify the assumption that such wholesale revision was not worth the
expense, this in turn led to the conclusion that one classification
system was little better than another, and that none was very good.
Failure of attempts to devise a universal classification scheme that
would be all things to all men in all situations seemed, in the minds
of many, proof of the failure of classification itself. Finally, in a
country so intensively mono- lingual as the United States the pressure
for a system that would bridge the conventionalities of language and
deal directly with a generalized symbolization of concepts was at a
minimum. Had the French influence been stronger in New England,
the Dutch in New York, the German in the Middle West, and the
Spanish on the West Coast the classified catalog might today have been
less of a curiosity than it now is, even in our large metropolitan public
libraries. As it is, the standardized subject headings of the Library
of Congress have dealt effectively with such minor linguistic variables
as bag, sack, poke, or skillet, frying-pan, spider.
THE RENAISSANCE OF CLASSIFICATION
Recently there have appeared manifestations of a renascence of a
interest in classification. The composite and multi-faceted character
of recorded knowledge, its interdependence and r elatedness, the
magnitude of its proliferation, or especially during the past half-
century, the variety of aspects from which it may be sought, and the
gravity of the social, economic, and political problems for the solu-
tion of which it is essential, all have combined to create a situation
with which traditional library procedures and processes are ill-fitted
to deal effectively. Growing improvement in the understanding of
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the operation of the human brain and the processes of thought have
focussed attention on the role of classification in cognition. A rejec-
tion of the taxonomic basis of classification for what Alfred North
Whitehead has called referential classification, and the development
of a wide variety of special classifications have revived interest in
the possibilities that classification can offer in improving the analysis
and retrieval of information. Rapidly growing interest in the develop-
ment of electronic computer -like devices for expediting bibliographic
search has compelled a re- examination of classification as the basis
for the construction of a machine language or languages, and this in
turn has necessitated a serious study of the logical bases for systems
for the organization of recorded knowledge.
Some indication of this revival may be shown by a tabulation of the
entries under the heading "Classification" in Library Literature from
1946 to 1957.
Entries in Library Literature Under the Heading Classification
U. S. and Foreign, 1946 - 1957, and 1937
Year United States Foreign Total
1957 26 45 71
1956 49 46 95
1955 35 45 80
1954 21 40 61
1953 36 42 78
1952 19 37 56
1951 20 48 68
1950 6 38 44
1949 11 24 35
1948 9 16 25
1947 9 38 47
1946 5 20 25
1937 18 43 61
These crude statistics suggest that interest in classification in
Europe has remained remarkably constant, that, with one exception, it
has exceeded that in the United States for every year since 1946, and
that, if the number of articles analyzed in Library Literature can be
taken as an index, interest in classification on this side of the Altantic
has been definitely on the increase. For a number of technical reasons
which cannot be dealt with here,
15
these statistics must be interpreted
with the utmost caution, but, when considered in conjunction with other
forms of evidence they may represent a trend toward an increasing
concern with problems in classification.
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This rebirth of interest in classification is receiving increased sup-
port from without the library profession. By this I do not mean the
documentalists and information specialists, whom I regard as librar-
ians. Mathematicians, logicians, engineers, physicists, anthropologists,
psychologists, linguists, and brain specialists all are becoming aware
of the organization of information as a field for research and many
within these professions have begun exploratory work in it. Such
activities will compel librarians to reappraise classification as well
as the effectiveness of their other procedures, for if they do not they
will lose control of the very profession they practice.
Across the Atlantic there are forces that strengthen interest in
classification here. Western Europe has long been a focus of activity
in advancing bibliographic classification, and to this end much of the
effort of the Federation International de Documentation has been di-
rected. Admittedly it has suffered from illusions of universality and,
at times, an over-zealous leadership, but these seem to be occupa-
tional hazards where problems of classification are concerned, and
much important work has come from such centers at The Hague, Brus-
sels, and Paris. In England the Classification Research Group, which
can certainly trace its origins to the pioneering work of Ranganathan,
has, in a surprisingly brief time, made rather remarkable progress
in reviving research in classification.
Encouraged by the success of the British venture, Mrs. Phyllis A.
Richmond, of the University of Rochester Library, began, not much
more than a year ago, the promotion of a comparable group in the
United States. At the present time this little band of kinspirits, which,
as an affiliate of the American Documentation Institute, now numbers
almost one hundred, has held three meetings in conjunction with the
annual conventions of the American Library Association, the Special
Libraries Association, and the American Documentation Institute.
Though it is still engaged in the task of identifying targets for re-
search, and despite the fact that it has not as yet developed a real
program of activities, it is symptomatic of the growing revival of in-
terest in classification. The promise of this activity is most gratify-
ing to those few of us who, under the leadership of Norman T. Ball,
were trying in 1947 and 1948 to direct the attention of the newly-
formed A.D.I, toward a more intensive attack upon the problems of
classification 16
Perhaps the most satisfying development of all has been the
growth in the use of the collection of special classifications maintained
by the Special Libraries Association in cooperation with, and serviced
by, the School of Library Science at Western Reserve University. This
collection now numbers some 600 titles and inquiries to and loans
from it are received and transmitted daily. The use that is made of
this material and the continuing generosity of many people in present-
ing to the collection such schemes as they have developed, are con-
vincing testimony that the librarian's concern with classification is
very far from atrophying.
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THE FUTURE OF CLASSIFICATION
The initial question to which this essay was addressed can no
longer be postponed. What is the future of library classification?
Certainly library classification, interpreted narrowly as a system f
for preserving order in library stacks is in no danger of extinction.
Stack order there must always be, or the resulting chaos would force
librarians into what Verner Clapp has graphically called "simian
search." Moreover, there seems little possibility that either the
Dewey decimal system or that of the Library of Congress will lose,
in the foreseeable future, their positions of preeminence as systems
for stack arrangement. The advantage of an early start, combined
with the geometric increase in the costs of reclassification as the
size of the book stock grows, diminishes significantly the relative
value of reclassification. Few, if any, libraries have had the courage
to follow the pattern of the John Crerar in reverting to fixed location,
and even this step is impracticable except in closed stack situations.
The D.C. may be "a 'ell of a 'ole," but we seem unable to discover
any other that is sufficiently superior to justify the risks of migra-
tion.
So far as the public library is concerned one may properly assume.
in view of the almost complete uselessness of both the D.C. and L.C.
to the general public, that special arrangements, in broad reader-
interest categories, for open shelf collections will be on the increase.
Though the librarian may not yet reject the Decimal Classification
for his own professional needs, the day of his missionary zeal for
Saint Melvil and all his works is, happily, at an end.
The continuing growth of special libraries, especially for the ad-
ministrative and research needs of business, industry, and govern-
ment, will promote increasing attention to the development of special
systems for the retrieval of precise information from a wide variety
of graphic records. Furthermore, it may also encourage increased
attention to the theory of classification itself.
But the area from which the most significant developments in clas-
sification may be anticipated is that in which attention is being given
to the development of new systems for mechanizing many of the
routines for the more effective utilization of recorded knowledge. New
information needs have posed new problems in organizing graphic
records, these problems have dictated new research into the nature
of information itself and the character of its use. Such research has
led to the development of new systems which have promoted the in-
vention of new machines, the limitations of which have intensified the
formulation of system theory. This analytical-synthetic cycle of
theory and technology must be maintained in reasonable balance, or
serious mal-adjustments will ensue. If the technology advances at too
great a distance beyond theory, the machine becomes the end rather
than the means and dictates in ways that it should not be permitted to
do the perimeters of the problem. On the other hand, theory cannot
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advance beyond the point at which the technology can support it, for
eventually technology places a ceiling upon theory through which the
latter cannot break because it lacks the equipment with which to work.
The theory of organizing knowledge and the patterns of its use, in
other words the theory of classification, lies at the very foundation of
this balance, for classification as a discipline is itself a convergence
of theory and technology. Its theory is rooted in logic, linguistics, and
the philosophy of science, enriched and supported by psychology, mathe-
matics, and neurology, especially the study of the human brain. Its
technology finds expression in such new fields as cybernetics, the
mechanization of information search, and machine translation. It is
no longer the exclusive possession of the librarian, but it is his re-
sponsibility to forge a new theory of classification and a new technol-
ogy for its manipulation from all the disciplines that can contribute to
classification as the means by which the reader and the text he needs
are brought into fruitful relationship.
One of the characters in a recent science-fiction novel by Robert
Heinlein says, "Dad claims that library science is the foundation of
all sciences just as math is the key and that we will survive or
flounder depending on how well the librarians do their job." If it be
true that librarianship is the foundation of all science, and I like to
think that it is, then certainly classification, the science of order by
which man structures the universe in which he finds himself and by
which his own behavior is patterned, is the mortar with which the
blocks of that foundation are held in unity.
Notes
1. Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York:
Wiley, 1958) pp. 67ff.
2. See Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality (New
York: McGraw Hill, 1950) pp. 18-20.
3. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court,
1925) p. 330.
4. V. Gordon Childe, Society and Knowledge (New York: Harpers,
1956) pp. 65-73.
5. Jesse H. Shera, "Pattern Structure, and Conceptualization in
Classification," Proceedings of the International Study Conference on
Classification for Information Retrieval, 13-17 May 1957 (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1957) pp. 19-21.
Jerome S. Bruner, Jacquile J. Goodnow, and George A. Austin,
A Study of Thinking (New York: Wiley, 1956) pp. 243-245.
6. W. Grey Walter, The Living Brain (New York: Norton, 1953)
p. 72.
127
7. Mephistopheles to the Young Student. From George R. Priest's
translation of Goethe's Faust.
8. Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1948) p. 218.
9. Ibid. p. 227.
10. See W.R.B. Prideaux, ''Library Economy (Chiefly Continental)
at the End of the Seventeenth Century," Library Association Record,
VI (March 15, 1904), 133.
11. Gustave Mouravit, Le Livre et la Petite Bibliotheque d'Amateur
. . . (Paris: Aubry, n.d.)
12. Phyllis A. Richmond, "Cats: An Example of Concealed Clas-
sification in Subject Headings," Library Resources and Technical
Services, III (Spring, 1959), 102-112.
13. B.C. Vickery, "The Need for Classification," Classification
and Indexing in Science (London: Butterworth, 1958).
14. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1959) p. 95.
15. The author has made every reasonable effort to eliminate
duplicate entries though admittedly some may have escaped attention.
The data are also doubtless distorted by changes over the years in
the periodicals indexed by Library Literature especially in its cover-
age of foreign literature. Figures are also skewed by the publication
of a new edition of D.C. or a revised section of L.C. Finally, fre-
quence of publication is not necessarily synonymous with reader in-
terest.
16. See Norman T. Ball, "Committee on Organization of Informa-
tion" American Documentation, I (January, 1950), 24-34.
128
